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Abstract
Understanding the network structure, and finding out the influential nodes
is a challenging issue in the large networks. Identifying the most influential
nodes in the network can be useful in many applications like immunization
of nodes in case of epidemic spreading, during intentional attacks on com-
plex networks. A lot of research is done to devise centrality measures which
could efficiently identify the most influential nodes in the network. There are
two major approaches to the problem: On one hand, deterministic strategies
that exploit knowledge about the overall network topology in order to find
the influential nodes, while on the other end, random strategies are com-
pletely agnostic about the network structure. Centrality measures that can
deal with a limited knowledge of the network structure are required. Indeed,
in practice, information about the global structure of the overall network is
rarely available or hard to acquire. Even if available, the structure of the
network might be too large that it is too much computationally expensive
to calculate global centrality measures. To that end, a centrality measure is
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proposed that requires information only at the community level to identify
the influential nodes in the network. Indeed, most of the real-world networks
exhibit a community structure that can be exploited efficiently to discover
the influential nodes. We performed a comparative evaluation of prominent
global deterministic strategies together with stochastic strategies with an
available and the proposed deterministic community-based strategy. Effec-
tiveness of the proposed method is evaluated by performing experiments on
synthetic and real-world networks with community structure in the case of
immunization of nodes for epidemic control.
Keywords: Complex Networks, Epidemic Dynamics, Community
Structure, Immunization Strategies
1. Introduction
Outbreak of infectious diseases is a serious threat to the lives of people
and it also brings serious economic loss for the victim countries. So, it is
very important to discover the propagation rules in the social groups in or-
der to prevent the epidemics or at least to control the epidemic spreading.
Vaccination allows to protect people and prevent them to transmit disease
among their contacts. As mass vaccination is not always feasible, due to
limited vaccination resources, targeted immunization strategies are of prime
interest for public health. Impact of the contact network topology on disease
transmission is a hot topic in the large networks study. A lot of work is done
towards this direction by various researchers [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8].
Network organization can be characterized at different scales ranging from
the microscopic to the macroscopic level. At the microscopic level, one con-
centrates on the differences between individuals in order to identify the most
influential ones. At this level, statistical measures are used to summarize
some of the overall network features. The centrality of a node is a very im-
portant feature. Since the nodes with high centrality values can propagate
information to the whole network more easily than the rest of the nodes with
low centrality measures, they are the ones to be targeted for immunization.
Unfortunately, there is no general consensus on the definition of centrality
and many measures are proposed. Degree centrality and betweenness cen-
trality are the most influential methods [9, 10]. They are studied extensively
to understand their effect on epidemic dynamics. The degree centrality of a
node is its number of links to other nodes, while the betweenness centrality
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measures its contribution to the shortest paths between every pair of nodes
in the network. As most real world-networks follow a power law distribution,
it is very efficient to immunize the hubs (i.e., nodes having high degrees)
preferentially. However, many real world networks are more structured than
merely having heterogeneous degree distributions.
Sometimes, there is no information available about the global structure of
the real-world networks. Hence, centrality measures based on locally avail-
able network information are of prime interest. Such strategies rely only
on local information around the selected nodes. The most basic strategy is
random immunization where target nodes are picked at random regardless
of the network topology. In acquaintance immunization, the selected node is
chosen randomly among the neighbors of a randomly picked node. As ran-
domly selected acquaintances have more connections than randomly selected
nodes, this method targets highly connected nodes [11]. It can be viewed as
a local approximation of a global degree based strategy.
The mesoscopic level of organization is mainly concerned by properties
shared by sets of nodes called communities. A community-structured net-
work is organized around different communities such that the number of links
connecting the nodes in the same community is relatively large as compared
to the number of links connecting nodes in different communities. While the
effect on epidemic dynamics of degree distribution is studied extensively, the
community structure of networks has attracted little attention. Its investi-
gation has recently started, despite the fact that many real-world networks
show significant community structure. Results reported in the literature con-
firm that the knowledge of the network degree distribution is not sufficient
to predict epidemic dynamics. Indeed, fundamentally different behaviors are
observed due to variations of the community structure in the networks with
the same degree distribution. Therefore, the design of immunization strate-
gies needs to take into account the community structure. At this level, the
focus is on structural hubs (i.e., the nodes connecting the largest number of
different communities). Indeed, these nodes act as bridges facilitating the
propagation of the epidemic from one dense community to another [12, 13].
The diffusion over the network is important to study for the epidemic spread-
ing. Samukhin et al. have studied the Laplacian operator of an uncorrelated
random network and diffusion processes on the networks. They have pro-
posed a strict approach for diffusion process [14]. An exact closed set of
integral equations are derived. which provide the averages of the Laplacian
operators resolvent, it initiated to describe the propagation of a random walks
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on the network. Mitrovic et al. have studied eigenvalue spectra and the dif-
fusion process with random walk in a various class of networks at mesoscopic
level [15]. Arenas et al. have studied the relationship among the topological
scale and dynamic time scale in the networks based on the dynamics closer
to synchronization of coupled oscillators. In their study they have considered
the communities of nodes organized in a hierarchical manner at different time
[16].
Immunization strategies in community-structured populations are previ-
ously investigated. Masuda [17] proposed an immunization strategy based on
the eigenvector centrality for community-structured networks. In this paper,
module based strategy technique is used for measuring the contribution of
the each node to the weighted community network in order to preferentially
immunize nodes that bridge important communities. The number of links
they share gives the weight of a link between any two communities. The in-
fluence of a node is related to the importance of the community together with
its connectivity to the other communities. The effectiveness of the method
is compared to alternative centrality measures (degree, betweenness, eigen-
vector) in the real and synthetic networks with modular structure. Three
community detection algorithms are used to uncover the non-overlapping
communities. The generated networks used to simulate real-world networks
are made of equal-sized communities with heterogeneous degree distributions.
Salathe´ et al. [12] proposed an immunization strategy and targeted at
nodes that connect to multiple communities, it was called community bridge
finder (CBF). CBF is a local algorithm based on random walk. Starting from
a node chosen randomly, it follows a random path until it reaches a node that
does not connect to more than one of the previously visited nodes. They have
used standard epidemic spreading model, susceptible-infected-resistant (SIR)
[18] for finding the results on both real-world and synthetic networks. The
authors compared three global centrality measures: degree, betweenness and
random walk, and two local strategies: acquaintance and CBF. It is shown
that the random walk centrality is the most successful strategy. Furthermore
CBF outperforms the acquaintance method. In this work, the communities
on the empirical network are defined functionally, and the synthetic data are
generated using the Watts and Strogatz model [19].
However, there are some major issues associated with these contributions
to the problem. First of all, the community structure of real-world networks
is often not known, and one must rely on a community detection algorithm in
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order to uncover it. Therefore, it is therefore difficult to measure the influence
of this operation on the results. Indeed, the classes of techniques available
to detect communities are both numerous and diverse, and until now, there
is no consensus on either a community definition or a universal detection
method. Even, when a ground truth based on functional features is avail-
able, the topology of the selected networks can hardly be diverse enough to
represent all types of systems encountered in various applications. To over-
come these limitations, artificial networks can be used. Indeed, a random
model allows generating as many networks as desired, while controlling some
of their topological properties. However, this strategy raises another issue:
the realism of the obtained networks, which should mimic closely real-world
networks in order to get relevant test results. It is worth mentioning that
some attempts are made to develop a theoretical framework for understand-
ing the effects of the modular structure in networks. Unfortunately, models
used in previous work are oversimplified. Simple cases in which modules are
homogeneous and of equal size are considered while in real-world networks,
modules are found to be heterogeneous in various aspects. For example, it is
well established that networks with a community structure are characterized
by a power-law distributed community size [20, 21, 22, 23].
Our investigations, address the above limitations. In order to under-
stand how community structure affects epidemic dynamics we perform an
extensive investigation using a realistic generative model [24] with controlled
topological properties and a representative set of immunization strategies.
The main goal of this study is to give a clear answer on which immuniza-
tion strategy should be preferred in order to control epidemics in networks
with community structure. Second, the impact of the community structure
is analyzed using the LFR benchmark algorithm [24]. We also perform the
experiments using the proposed method on some real-world networks to fur-
ther validate results on synthetic benchmark. An extensive experimental
evaluation is conducted in order to investigate their efficiency as compared
to global centrality measures, random-walk based stochastic measures as well
as another community-based strategy. The major contributions of this pa-
per are twofold. First, a new local centrality measure based on the network
community structure is introduced. Second, an extensive experimental evalu-
ation is conducted in order to investigate its efficiency as compared to global
centrality measures, random-walk based stochastic measures as well as an
alternative community-based strategy. The impact of the community struc-
ture is analyzed using both controlled synthetic benchmark produced by the
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LFR algorithm [24] and real-world networks. The SIR epidemic spreading
model [25] is considered in order to test the immunization strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, various cen-
trality measures and immunization strategies are presented. Classic epidemic
spreading model is discussed to understand the diffusion over the heteroge-
neous networks. In section 4, the benchmark model is introduced and its
main properties are recalled. Section 5 is devoted to the experimental re-
sults. The observations and findings are described in section 7.
2. Immunization Strategies
Targeted immunization strategies can be divided into three categories
based on their requirement about the knowledge of the network topology.
Global strategies exploit the knowledge of the full network structure in order
to find the influential nodes while Community-based strategies are able to
work with a limited amount of information. The third category of immuniza-
tion strategies are stochastic strategies which rely only on local information
around randomly selected nodes. These three types of strategies are de-
scribed below in detail:
2.1. Global Strategies:
These immunization strategies are based on an ordering of the nodes of
the whole network according to an influence measure. Nodes are then tar-
geted (removed) in the decreasing order of their rank. The influence of a node
is computed according to some centrality measure. In this study, two promi-
nent global centrality measures (degree and betweenness) are considered in
order to compare with the proposed strategies.
1. Degree Centrality : Degree centrality denotes the number of imme-
diate neighbors of a node, i.e. which are only one edge away from the node.
It is simple but very coarse. It can be interpreted as the number of walk of
length one starting at the considered node. It measures the local influence of
a node. It has many ties and fails to take into account the influence weight
of even the immediate neighbors (Algorithm 1). Even if it is a local measure,
the immunization strategy is global because it needs to rank all the nodes of
the network according to their degree.
2. Betweenness Centrality : Betweenness centrality defines the influ-
ence of a node based on the number of shortest paths between every pair of
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Algorithm 1 To calculate Degree Centrality
Input Graph G(V,E)
Output A map/dictionary with (node, centrality value) pairs
Initialize an empty map, M with (node, value) pair.
for each node u in set V : do
Calculate the number, n of adjacent nodes or neighbors of u.
Add the pair (u, n) to the map M .
end for
Return the map M .
nodes that passes through that node. It basically tries to identify the influ-
ence of a node in terms of information flow through the network (Algorithm
2). In this strategy, the nodes are target based on their overall betweenness
centrality. The computation of betweenness has high time complexity.
Algorithm 2 To calculate Betweenness Centrality
Input Graph G(V,E)
Output A map/dictionary with (node, centrality value) pairs
Initialize an empty map, M with (node, value) pair format.
Calculate the number (n) of shortest paths between every pair of nodes
(a, b) in the graph.
Store the result in step 2 in a map, M with pairs ( (a, b), n ).
for each node u in set V : do
Let BC(u) be the betweenness centrality of node u, and initialize it to
zero.
for each node pair (a, b) in the map M do
Count the number (n1) of shortest paths between the nodes a and b,
of which node u is also a part of.
BC(u) = BC(u) + n1/n
end for
end for
Return the map M .
2.2. Stochastic Strategies:
Stochastic strategies do not need any information about the global struc-
ture of the network. They are able to work with a very limited amount of local
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information about a node. They basically try to find the influential nodes
based on random walks. Such algorithms, agnostic about the full network
structure are necessary in some situations. For example, the full structure
of the contact network relevant to the spread of a disease is generally not
known.
1. Random Acquaintance: Random Acquaintance immunization
strategy is proposed by Cohen et al. [11]. It works as follows: pick a ran-
dom node v0, and then pick its acquaintance or neighbor, v1 at random.
Immunize the nodes which are picked as acquaintances at least n times. An
acquaintance is immunized immediately in the case of n = 1. This strategy
identifies highly connected individuals without any information about the
global structure of the network.
2. Community Bridge Finder (CBF): The CBF algorithm, pro-
posed by Salathe et al. [12], is a random walk based algorithm, aimed at
identifying nodes connected to multiple communities. The algorithm begins
with selecting a random node as the starting node. Then a random path is
followed until a node is found that is not connected to more than one of the
previously visited nodes on the random walk. It is based on the idea that the
first node not connecting back to already visited nodes of the current ran-
dom walk is more likely to belong to a different community. This strategy is
completely agnostic about the network structure.
2.3. Community-based Strategies:
These strategies do not require any information about the global struc-
ture of the network. They only require information at the community level.
In the case where the community structure is unknown, it can be uncov-
ered with local community detection algorithms [26, 27]. In a network with
community structure, the degree of a node can be split into two contribu-
tions: the intra-community links connecting it to nodes in its community
and the inter-community links connecting it to nodes outside its commu-
nity. Strength of the community structure of a network depends upon inter
and intra-community links. A network is said to have a strong community
structure if a small fraction of total links in the networks lies between the
communities. It is said to have well defined communities. On the contrary,
if a large fraction of total links lies between the communities, then the net-
work does not contain well-defined communities and it is said to have a weak
community structure.
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The topology of a network can be fully specified by its adjacency matrix
A. In the case of an undirected, unweighted network, A(i, j) is equal to 1 if
nodes i and j are directly connected to each other otherwise it is equal to
zero. Considering a community C of a network, the total degree of a node i
can be split in to two parts:
ki(C) = k
in
i (C) + k
out
i (C). (1)
The degree ki of a node i is equal to the total number of its connections with
other nodes, ki =
∑
j A(i, j). The In-degree of a node is equal to the number
of edges connecting it to other nodes of the same community and can be
calculated as kini (C) =
∑
j∈C A(i, j). The out-degree of a node i is equal to
the number of connections to the nodes lying outside the community and can
be calculated as kouti (C) =
∑
j /∈C A(i, j).
1. Mod Centrality: Masuda [17] proposed to apply the dynamical
importance strategy to the network representing the community structure.
Given a community structure of the original network the community weighted
network is build. Its nodes are the communities and the weight of a link
between two communities is equal to the number of links they share. Then
node that maximizes the following quantity are sequentially removed:
(2u˜K − x)
∑
I 6=K
dkI u˜I (2)
The first factor measures the importance of the module that node k belongs
to (i.e. (2u˜K − x) ≈ 2u˜K) where, u˜K represents the eigen vector correspond-
ing to Kth community. The second quantity in the equation represents the
connectivity of node k to other important modules (i.e.,
∑
I 6=K dkI u˜I). On
the basis of the modular structure determined for the original network, u˜I
is recalculated and nodes are removed one at a time. If all the modules are
isolated, nodes are removed sequentially in the descending order of in-degree,
kini of the nodes. In-degree of all the remaining nodes is recalculated after
the removal of each node. This strategy preferentially immunizes globally
important nodes having important inter-community links rather than locally
important ones such as local hubs (Algorithm 3).
This strategy has got several drawbacks. It defines the importance of a
node based on eigenvectors of the network. Calculation of eigenvectors is a
computationally expensive task. Additionally, the centralities of the remain-
ing nodes are re-calculated after the removal of nodes with high centrality.
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It also needs a coarse global information to which other community nodes
are connected. When the communities are isolated after removing all the
bridge nodes, it reduces to selecting the nodes only on the basis of higher
in-degree. To overcome these drawbacks, we propose a strategy requiring less
information, computationally cheaper and as efficient.
Algorithm 3 To calculate Mod Centrality
Input Graph/Network G(V,E), Community Structure of the network
Output A map/dictionary with (node, centralityvalue) pairs
Initialize an empty map, M with (node, value) pair format.
Build a community weighted network using the community structure as
follows:
Communities of the original network represent the nodes in the community
weighted network.
Total number of links between two communities denotes the weight of the
link between the corresponding nodes in the weighted network.
Build an eigen matrix of the weighted network.
for each node k in the graph do
Let MC(k) be the mod centrality of node k.
Let u˜K represents the eigen vector corresponding to the community of
node k. dkI represents the number of inter-community links that exist
between node k and community I.
if there are links remaining between any two communities in the network
then
MC(k) = (2u˜K)
∑
I 6=K
dkI u˜I
else
MC(k) = dkK i.e. no of intra-connections of node k in its own com-
munity
end if
Add the pair (k, MC(k)) to the map M .
end for
Return the map M .
2. Proposed Commn Centrality: Commn centrality of a node is
the weighted combination of its in-degree and out-degree. This centrality
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measure takes into account both intra and inter-community links of a node.
It marks hubs or bridges as the influential nodes based on the strength of
the community structure of the network. Let us consider an example of a
network with community structure (Algorithm 4).
Algorithm 4 To calculate Commn Centrality
Input Graph/Network G(V,E), Community Structure of the network with
community list, CL
Output A map/dictionary with (node, centrality value) pairs
Initialize an empty map, M with (node, value) pair format.
for each community C in the list CL do
calculate the fraction, µC of outer connections to the total connections
in the community.
end for
for each node i in the graph do
Calculate the no of intra-community links of node i, kcini
calculate the no of inter-community links of i, kcouti
end for
for each community C in the list CL do
for each node i in community C do
Calculate the Comm Centrality for node i using the equation (refer-
ence to comm equation)
end for
Add the pair (i, CC(i)) to the map M .
end for
Return the map M .
In Fig. 1, it can be seen that node 2 has got many connections with the
other nodes in its own community. It can be called as the hub or leader in its
own community and thus can be labeled as an influential node. This is the
node which will play a major role in spreading any kind of information or
epidemics in its community. If this node is removed, there is very little chance
of epidemic spreading to other nodes in the community. On the other hand,
node 12 has got many connections with the nodes in other communities.
It can be called as a bridge node, which connects its community to other
communities in the network. Hence, it will also be responsible for information
or epidemic propagation to other communities. So, it can be concluded that
both community hubs and bridges are influential nodes in a network and play
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Figure 1: Proposed Centrality Measure
a key role in epidemic propagation. Hence, a centrality measure is needed
which marks those nodes as influential which have got a good balance of
inner and outer connections in the community. In other words, it must be
successful in finding both the community hubs and bridges. We propose new
centrality measure, Commn centrality, defined as follows.
Commn centrality for a node i, belonging to community C can be calcu-
lated as follows:
CC(i) = (1 + µC) ∗

 kini
max
j
(kinj ∀j ∈ C)
∗ R

 +
(1− µC) ∗

 kouti
max
j
(koutj ∀j ∈ C)
∗ R


2
(3)
Here, R is any integer number of choice, to get both in-degree and out-
degree values in the same range i.e. [0, R]. As usually, out-degree values
of the nodes are very low as compared to their in-degree values. A good
choice for the value of R will be maximum in-degree in the community C i.e.
max
j
(kinj ∀j ∈ C).
µC is the fraction of outer connections to the total connections in the
community C, and can be calculated as follows:
µC =
∑
i∈C
kouti /ki
size(C)
(4)
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In equation (3), first in-degree and out-degree of the nodes are normalized by
the maximum in-degree and out-degree, respectively in the community and
brought in the same range. Then the term with out-degree is raised up to
power two where as the term with in-degree is not raised. This is done to give
more importance to out-degree of the nodes than in-degree while calculating
their centrality value. Consider two nodes i and j belonging to the same
community. If we have to mark one node as more influential than the other,
then there can be three possible cases to consider.
• First case, both in-degree and out-degree of one node, say i is larger
than the other node j i.e.
kini > k
in
j and k
out
i > k
out
j
• Second, in-degree (or out-degree) of node i is equal to that of node j,
and out-degree (or indegree) of i is larger than that of j i.e.
(kini = k
in
j and k
out
i > k
out
j ) or (k
out
i = k
out
j and k
in
i > k
i1n
j )
• Third, indegree of one node, say i is larger than that of other node j,
but j has got higher outdegree than node i.
kini > k
in
j and k
out
i < k
out
j
In the first two cases, indisputably, node i will be marked as more in-
fluential. But, in the third case, we mark node j as more central or influ-
ential than node i because of more outer connections of j. The only con-
straint is that the in-degree of node j must not be very smaller than that
of i. That is, node j must also have comparable number of inner connec-
tions. Specifically, as per equation (3), node j is marked more influential if
(kini − k
in
j ) ≤ ((k
out
j )
2− (kouti )
2), otherwise node i is considered more influen-
tial.
Also note, in the equation (3), µC and (1 − µC) are assigned as weights
to the in-degree and out-degree terms respectively. This is done to adapt
to the strength of a particular community. For example, if a community is
very cohesive, i.e. there are very less outer connections as compared to total
connections. µC value of this community will be low and hence more weight
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will be given to the out-degree terms to target the rare nodes with outer
connections in the community. On the other hand, if a community has a lot
of outer connections and accordingly large value of µC , more weight will be
given to the in-degree term.
Nodes are removed sequentially from each community in the decreasing
order of their centrality value in their respective community. Number of
nodes to be removed from a community are kept proportional to the com-
munity size. Hence, more nodes are removed from larger communities than
from the smaller communities. Also note that removing a node can modify
the network topology and hence the centrality of the remaining nodes might
not be the same. So, the centralities of the remaining nodes are recalculated
after removing the node with highest centrality value.
3. Classical epidemic spreading, SIR model
Classical SIR model [25, 28] is one of the most investigated epidemic
spreading model for complex networks. In this model, nodes are in one of
the three compartments —Susceptible (healthy), Infected (those who in-
fected with disease and also actively spread it) and Removed (immunized
or dead). Susceptible nodes represent the individuals which are not yet in-
fected with the disease. Infected nodes are the ones which are infected with
the disease and can spread the disease to the susceptible nodes. Removed
nodes represent the individuals which are infected and are immunized or
died. These nodes are not neither infected again, nor they can transmit
the infection to others. The epidemic is propagated through the nodes by
pairwise contacts between the infected and susceptible nodes in the net-
work. Following the law of mass action, the spreading process evolves with
direct contact of the infected nodes with susceptible nodes in the popula-
tion. The epidemic spreads from one infected node to another susceptible
nodes in a single time step with λ rate, if an undirected edge exists be-
tween them. An infected node become removed node if it is immunized/dead
with rate σ. Here, S(k, t), I(k, t),R(k, t) are the expected values of suscep-
tible, infected and removed nodes in network with degree k at time t. Let
S(k,t) = S(k, t)/N(k), I(k,t) = I(k, t)/N(k), R(k,t) = R(k, t)/N(k) be the
fraction of susceptible, infected and removed nodes, respectively with degree
k at time t. These fractions of the nodes satisfy the normalization condition,
S(k,t)+I(k,t)+R(k,t) = 1, where N(k) represents the total number of nodes
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with degree k, in the network. Above epidemic spreading process can be
summarized by the following set of pairwise interactions.
S1 + I2
λ
−→ I1 + I2,
(when infected meets with the susceptible, it makes them infected
at rate λ)
I1
σ
−→ R1,
(spontaneously any infected node will become removed node with rate σ
The formulation of this model for analyzing complex networks as interact-
ing Markov chains. The framework is used to derive from the first-principles,
the mean-field equations for the dynamics of epidemic spreading in the uncor-
related heterogeneous complex networks (scale free networks) with arbitrary
correlations. These are given below.
dS(k,t)
dt
= −kλS(k,t)
∑
l
I(l, t)P (l|k). (5)
dI(k,t)
dt
= −σI(k,t) + λS(k, t)
∑
l
I(l, t)P (l|k). (6)
dR(k,t)
dt
= σI(k,t). (7)
Where the conditional probability P (l|k) is the degree-degree correlation
function that is randomly chosen edge emanating from a node of degree k
leads to a node of degree l. Here, it is assumed that the degree of nodes in
the whole network are uncorrelated. Therefore, degree-degree correlation is
P (l|k) = lP (l)
〈k〉
for uncorrelated complex networks where P (l) is the degree
distribution and 〈k〉 is the average degree of the network (the edge will be
biased to fall on vertices of high degree, hence the conditional probability
P (l|k) is proportional to kP (k)). Epidemic spreading model is defined for
correlated scale free networks [8]. It is shown that the critical threshold for
epidemic spreading is independent of the removing mechanism. It was found
that the critical threshold as, λc =
〈k〉
〈k2〉
. Hence, it implies that epidemic
threshold is absent in large size scale free networks (〈k2〉 → ∞, λc → 0).
This result is not good for epidemic control, since the epidemics will exist in
the real networks for any non zero value of spreading rate λ.
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4. Synthetic Benchmark Data
Generative models allow to produce large variations of synthetic networks
easily and quickly. These models provide a control on some topological prop-
erties of the generated networks, making it possible to mimic the targeted
system features. The only point of concern is the level of realism of the
generated networks, which is a prerequisite to obtain relevant test results.
To date, the LFR (Lancichinetti, Fortunato and Radicchi) [24] model is the
most efficient solution in order to generate synthetic networks with com-
munity structure. Consequently, it is used to generate the networks with a
non-overlapping community structure. It is based on the configuration model
(CM) [29], which generates networks with power law degree distribution. The
generative process performs in three steps. First, it uses the configuration
model to generate a network with a power-law degree distribution with ex-
ponent γ. Second, virtual communities are defined so that their sizes follow
a power-law distribution with exponent β. Each node is randomly affected
to a community, provided the community size is greater or equal to the node
internal degree. Third, an iterative process takes place in order to rewire cer-
tain links, such that the proportion of intra-community and inter-community
links is changed so that it gets close to the mixing coefficient value µ, while
preserving the degree distribution. This model guarantees to obtain real-
istic features (power-law distributed degrees and community sizes). It also
includes a rich set of parameters which can be tuned to get the desired net-
work topology. These parameters are- the mixing parameter µ, the average
degree k, the maximum degree kmax, the maximum community size cmax,
and the minimum community size cmin.
For small µ values, the communities are distinctly separated because they
share only a few links, whereas when µ increases, the proportion of inter-
community links becomes higher, making community identification a difficult
task. The network has no community structure for a limit value of the mixing
coefficient given by:
µlim > (n− n
max
c )/n, (8)
where n and nmaxc are number of nodes in the network and in the biggest
community, respectively [30].
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5. Experimental Set-up
To investigate the spread of an infectious disease, the classical SIR model
of epidemic spreading is used. Initially, all the nodes are treated as suscepti-
ble. After this initial set-up, a fraction of nodes are chosen at random to be
infected and the remaining nodes are considered to be susceptible (Algorithm
5).
Algorithm 5 SIR Algorithm
Input:Graph G(V,E), I, λ, σ
Output:Total no of nodes infected during the process, T I
Select I number of nodes at random to be marked as infected and place
them in infected list.
Mark all other nodes as susceptible.
while infected list is not empty do
select one infected node u from the list.
for every node v adjacent to u do
if v is susceptible then
with probability equal to λ:
mark v as infected, and add to the infected list.
increase T I by one.
else
with probability equal to σ:
mark v as recovered, and remove from the infected list.
end if
end for
end while
return T I
The infection spreads through the contact network during each time step,
where λ is the transmission rate of infection being spread from an infected
node to a susceptible node, and I is the number of infected neighboring nodes.
Infected nodes removed with rate σ at each time step. After the recovery
of a node occurs, its state is toggled from infected to resistant. Simulations
are halted if there are no infected nodes left in the network, and the total
number of infected nodes is analyzed. This time foe halting is called steady
state time.
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To investigate the efficiency of the proposed strategies, synthetic networks
are generated using the LFR algorithm. In order to select appropriate val-
ues for the network parameters, we considered several studies of real-world
networks. For the power-law exponents, we used γ = 3 and β = 2, which
seem to be the most representative values. Concerning the number of nodes
and links, no typical values emerge. Studies show that real-world complex
networks can have very different sizes, defined on a wide range going from
tens to millions of nodes. The average and maximal degrees are also very
variable, so it is difficult to characterize them too. As a result, we selected
some consensual values for these parameters, while considering also the com-
putational aspect of the simulations [31]. The parameters values used for the
generation of the LFR networks in this study are given in the Table 1.
Table 1: Parameters for the LFR network generation
Number of nodes, n 7500
Average degree, 〈k〉 10
Maximum degree, kmax 180
Mixing parameter, µ 0.2, 0.3, 0.5
γ 3
β 2
Minimum community size, Cmin 5
Maximum community size, Cmax 180
In order to better understand the influence of the community structure,
networks with various µ values (ranging from 0.2 to 0.5) are generated. For
each µ value, 10 sample networks are generated. Each simulation is run on
these 10 networks and the mean values of the results together with their
standard deviation are reported in the Fig. 2.
After forming the community structure various immunization strategies
are performed on the given network according to the Algorithm 6. The
network obtained after applying immunization is used to study the epidemic
diffusion by using SIR model.
6. Results and Discussion
In the simulations, final population of the removed nodes (R∞) is calcu-
lated to study the epidemic outbreak in the given population (network). As,
18
Algorithm 6 Immunization Algorithm
Input:Graph G(V,E), Centrality measure(C), No of nodes to immunize(n)
Output:Graph with Immunized/Removed Nodes
1. Calculate the centrality of every node in the graph using the measure
C.
2. Sort the nodes in decreasing order of their centrality values.
3. Remove top n nodes with highest centrality values from the graph G.
4. Return graph G with immunized/removed nodes.
R(k, t) represents the size of removed nodes with degree k at time t. Hence,
the final number of removed nodes at t = ∞, time, ∞ is sufficiently large
at which epidemic process will be achieved its steady state. At this time no
more infected nodes will left. The total number of remove nodes are
Rt =
∑
k
R(k, t)
at t =∞ (9)
R∞ =
∑
k
R(k,∞)
The results of the simulations using various available immunization strate-
gies (degree, betweenness, acquaintance, CBF, mod) and proposed immu-
nization strategies, Commn on LFR generated networks are shown in Fig. 2.
Here, recovering rate σ is kept equal to 0.1 and spreading rate, λ is varied
with two values, 0.1 and 0.9. The removed fraction of nodes (%) is men-
tioned by g. Let us take the case when λ = 0.1 at the left side of the Fig. 2
for all µ values. The global centrality based methods (degree, betweenness)
work efficiently in every case. After removing or immunizing only 30% of
the nodes and epidemic spreading die. This is expected as both the meth-
ods exploit the information about the overall network topology. When the
stochastic strategies (Random Acquaintance and CBF ) are used, 50% nodes
need to be removed in order to stop the epidemic spreading. This is the price
to pay for not knowing the global structure of the network. It is interesting
that the proposed community-based centrality measures, Commn and Mod
strategies are almost as effective as the global centrality methods despite the
fact that they are agnostic about the full network structure. Furthermore,
they perform a lot better than the Acquaintance and CBF strategies, with
just the information about the community structure of the network.
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The reason why the proposed Commn centrality based strategy is effec-
tive, can be explained by the specific position of the targeted nodes within
the network. It takes into account, both the in-degree and out-degree of
the nodes. First it tries to remove or immunize the nodes which have more
outer connections to other communities. In the equation 3, out-degree of
the node is raised up to power two, for this purpose. In a group of people,
these are the individuals which pass all the information contained in their
group to other groups. These nodes can be considered to be the bridges
between the communities. When these nodes are removed, most of the paths
or bridges between different communities are lost. Communities are isolated
and thus the epidemic is not able to spread across the communities. After
removing the nodes with higher out-degrees, nodes are selected which have
lot of connections inside their own community. They can be considered as
the core points of their community. In a network of people, these individuals
are the leaders, representatives or agents of information flow in their com-
munities. These high in-degree nodes are connected to many other nodes in
their community. Most of the regular nodes in a community are not directly
connected to each other. They would be connected to each other through
the paths which would most likely contain these high in-degree nodes. These
nodes if infected from outside, have a greater chance of infecting the whole
community. When these high in-degree nodes are removed from the com-
munities, the communities break from inside. In other words, the paths
connecting the regular nodes to each other are broken. The remaining nodes
are not able to contact each other and thus the epidemic is not able to affect
a significant part of community, and it dies soon.
The underlying idea in proposing the centrality measure which is sim-
ply based on in-degree and out-degree of the nodes is that they intuitively
represent the global degree and betweenness centralities at the community
level. A node with a high in-degree or out-degree has generally a high overall
degree. Indeed, the total degree of a node is the addition of in-degree and
out-degree. A node with high in-degree is probably a node with a high be-
tweenness measure in its community, as it will be contained in most of the
paths connecting the regular nodes to each other in the community. Simi-
larly, a node with high out-degree is probably a node with high betweenness
measure in the overall network. Indeed, these high out-degree nodes are part
of most of the paths connecting the nodes falling in different communities.
Fig. 2 {(b), (d), (f)} reports the SIR simulation results for λ = 0.9 and
σ = 0.1. The results are very similar except the fact that in this case, a
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greater g need to be immunized in order to stop the epidemic spreading.
This is true for all the strategies. For example, when λ is equal to 0.1, degree
and betweenness centrality based methods required only 30% of the nodes
to be removed to mitigate the epidemic spreading, whereas now they require
50% of the nodes to be immunized or removed. Indeed, when λ increases,
the probability of an infected node to infect its neighbors gets higher. So,
the epidemic spread at a higher rate, and thus more nodes are needed to be
immunized to prevent the epidemic spreading.
The dynamics of the fraction of susceptible (ρs), infected (ρi) and removed
(ρr ) nodes (in %) for different values of spreading rate λand removing rate
σ are reported in Fig. 3 plots without immunization and with the proposed
community based immunization by considering, g = 20% are given for com-
parative purposes.
The dynamics of of respectively, the fraction of nodes of the total nodes
in % for the susceptible (ρs), infected (ρi) and removed (ρr ) for different
values of spreading rates, λ and removing rate σ is reported in Fig. 3. In
the given Fig. 3, time evolution is plotted without immunization and with
proposed community based immunization, Commn, strategy.
We also used real-world networks to further validate the results on syn-
thetic networks with controlled properties. Statistics of these networks are
given in Table 2. Community structures of the networks are discovered us-
ing local community detection algorithms [26, 27]. Figs. 4(a)-4(d) show the
results of comparison of available and proposed immunization strategies on
these real-world networks.
Table 2: Statistics of Real-World Networks
Dataset Nodes Edges No. of Communities
Power Grid Network 5,004 6,597 168
PGP Network 10,680 24,316 153
Gnutella Network 62,586 1,47,892 171
WWW Network 3,52,729 11,17,563 3060
The first network is the Power grid network [19]. Power grid data set
comprises of an undirected, unweighted network representing the topology of
the Western States Power Grid of the United States. Numerical results are
shown in Fig. 4(a). Proposed Commn centrality performs as well as degree
centrality and better than all other centrality measures.
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The Second example is the social network called Pretty Good Privacy(PGP)
network [32]. This is the interaction network of users of the PGP algorithm.
A link between two persons denotes the sharing of confidential information
using the encryption algorithm on the internet. Results for the network are
shown in Fig. 4(b). Here, Mod centrality works a little better than the
Commn centrality, but at least both takes around 10% of the nodes needed
to be removed from the network in order to lose its giant component.
Fig. 4(c) shows the results for the third network, Gnutella peer-to-peer
network [33]. This is a network of Gnutella hosts from 2002. The nodes rep-
resent Gnutella hosts, and the directed edges represent connections between
them. Again, the network is treated as undirected ignoring the direction
of edges. For this network, Commn and degree centrality work better, but
performance of other centrality measures is also close.
Results of various centrality measures on the fourth network, World Wide
Web [34] are shown in Fig. 4(d). In this network, each node represents a
webpage and a directed link between the nodes shows a hyperlink from a
webpage to another. Direction of the links have been ignored. For this
network, Commn centrality outperforms other centrality measures.
Hence, the proposed centrality measure performs at least as good as the
global degree and in some cases, better than betweenness and community-
based mod centralities with less information about the network structure and
in lesser time.
To quantify the dynamical differences in the epidemic spreading process
when a fraction of nodes is immunized by using the proposed immunization
strategy, time evolution plots are generated. Time evolution plots of, re-
spectively, the fraction of the total nodes in % of susceptable, infected and
recovered population in the network with immunization and without immu-
nization, are displayed in Fig. 3. λ = 0.5 & σ = 0.1 and λ = 1 & σ = 0.1 is
considered for the time evolution plots to understand the dynamical differ-
ences.
The experimental results reveal that, the proposed Commn centrality is
effective in identifying the influential nodes to be selected for immunization
to prevent or mitigate the epidemic spreading. The proposed measure is as
effective as the global degree and betweenness centrality based methods, but
do not require any information about the global structure of the network.
Community-based centrality and Mod centrality also works as well but they
have certain drawbacks as pointed out earlier. We have proposed an alter-
native centrality measure which can be employed to find out the influential
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nodes in networks with community structure. The investigated strategy also
performs better than the stochastic strategies, Acquaintance and CBF strate-
gies, with only the information about the local (community-wise) structure
of the network. This suggests that the local information is sufficient to design
an immunization strategy.
7. Conclusions
There is no enough information available about the global structure of the
underlying relevant contact network in order to control the epidemic spread-
ing. Therefore, efficient immunization strategies are required that can work
with the information available at the community level. Results of our inves-
tigation, on a realistic synthetic benchmark as well as real-world social net-
works, show that the community structure plays a major role in the epidemic
dynamics. It is observed that the proposed Commn centrality based immu-
nization strategy is effective in controlling the epidemic spreading. It works as
well as the global centrality measures (degree and betweenness), without any
knowledge of the global network structure. This centrality measure defined
at the community level is a good approximation of global centrality mea-
sures. The in-degree part of the Commn centrality of a node represents its
degree and betweenness centralities, relative to its own community, whereas,
the out-degree part represents these global centralities relative to the other
communities of the network. This strategy is also sensitive to the community
structure of the network and hence automatically selects the influential nodes
which have got a good balance of inner and outer connections to their com-
munity. Hence, this strategy is quite efficient as it generalizes to the networks
with varying strength of community structure. Furthermore, unlike global
centrality measures, the proposed measures do not require any knowledge of
the global network topology and thus can be easily and quickly computed.
It also overcomes the drawbacks of the Mod strategy also proposed for net-
works with community structure. Furthermore, it performs better than the
stochastic strategies, Acquaintance and CBF. Finally, the main lesson of this
work is that exploiting the local information on the network topology can
be very effective in order to design efficient immunization strategies that can
be used in large scale networks. These preliminary results pave the way for
more investigations on alternative community topological measures.
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(c) µ=0.3, λ=0.1 (d) µ=0.3, λ=0.9
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(e) µ=0.5, λ=0.1 (f) µ=0.5, λ=0.9
Figure 2: Effect of various immunization strategies on the total number of infected nodes
during the SIR simulation on LFR network with σ = 0.1
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Figure 3: Dynamical diffusion over the network against time, t. Fraction of the susceptible,
infected and removed nodes (%) in the population respectively, ρs, ρi and ρr nodes without
immunization and with immunization (20%) strategy for different values of λ and σ
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Figure 4: Size of Largest Connected Component against the various centrality measures
(a) Power Grid Network (b) PGP Network (c) Gnutella Network (d) WWW Network
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